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for Rehearing 
other judicial 
Appellees hereby respond to Appellants' Petition for 
Rehearing in the above-captioned matter. This Court's 
decision/ filed May 17, 1991, correctly affirms the trial 
court's determination that Appellees' deficiency action was 
timely commenced. As Appellants' Petition 
presents no new facts, legal authority, or 
analysis to merit review of this court's decision, the Petition 
for Rehearing should be denied. 
Essentially, Appellant's forward a single argument 
under several captions. That argument is tl 
not consider its earlier attempt at persuas: 
apparently assumes that since the Court did not find in its 
favor, the Court must not have realized th^ consequences of its 
action or reviewed the authority cited. Tl^ is conclusion is 
erroneous, as the Court's decision rests u^on proper statutory 
i 
interpretation and principles set forth in its prior decisions. 
ARGUMENT 
STANDARD FEDERAL'S DEFICIENCY ACTION 
hat the Court did 
ion. Appellant 
WAS PROPERLY FILED 
A. Filing is Sufficient to "Commence" 
An Action 
Section 57-1-32, Utah Code Ann, pr pvides that 
At any time within three months after any sale of 
property under a trust deed, as he 
provided, an action may be commend 
balance due upon the obligation fo 
deed was given as security. . . . 
supplied). 
reinabove 
ed to recover the 
r which the trust 
(emphasis 
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In order to clarify the action required to initiate an action 
under this section, Rule 3 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
states that "[a] civil action is commenced (1) by filing a 
complaint with the court". The Rule further provides that "[t]he 
court shall have jurisdiction from the time of filing the 
complaint." There is no dispute that a complaint was filed in 
the proper court within the time limits established by Section 
57-1-32. 
The Court correctly noted that the "more sensible view 
of the operation of the three-month limitation period contained 
in section 57-1-32 is that its primary purpose is satisfied when 
the foreclosing party provides notice to the debtor that a 
deficiency will be sought by filing the action." Standard 
Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n v. Kirkbride, 161 Utah Adv. Rep. 26, 
28 (Utah 1991). This is consistent with this Court's prior 
decisions which have consistently determined that an action is 
timely commenced where the complaint was filed within the period 
of limitations, even though the summons was not served until 
after such period. Madsen v. Borthick, 769 P.2d (Utah 1988), 
West Mt. Lime & Stone Co. v. Danley, 38 Utah 218, 111 P. 647 
(1910), Keyser v. Pollock, 20 Utah 371, 59 P. 87 (1899). 
Kirkbride and Soule seek to establish an expanded, more 
onerous definition of "commencement". According to them, "[t]he 
filing of a complaint is an ex parte act that does not give 
notice to anybody. Only the service of a summons provides the 
-2-
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proper notice." (Appellants' Brief, p. 3). There is no authority 
cited for this novel proposition, and it id contrary to the plain 
language of Rule 3 and this Court's prior holdings. 
This argument was considered by the Oklahoma Supreme 
Court in a recent decision. In Ross v. Hayes, 62 Okla.B.J. 2428 
C 9 Q 1 ) , the Oklahoma court was presented wi 
an action dismissed without prejudice, in w[ 
not been served with summons, may be filed 
dismissal pursuant to the savings clause of 
§ 100." As in Utah, Oklahoma's savings sta 
action" commenced within due time, and prov 
period in which actions dimissed without pr| 
refiled. The court, in reaching its decisi 
The savings clause of 12 O.S. 198lj 
to lawsuits timely filed and later 
grounds unrelated to the merits of 
Because of its remedial nature, § 
to be liberally construed. The ca 
statutory construction is a determj 
legislative intent. However, wher 
has plainly expressed itself, ther 
th the issue "whether 
hich defendants have 
within one year of the 
12. O.S. 1891 
tute applies to "any 
ides for a one year 
ejudice may be 
on, ruled: 
§ 100 is applicable 
dismissed on 
the controversy. 
100's provisions are 
rdinal rule of 
ination of the 
e the Legislature 
|e is no need for 
judicial interpretation. The language of § 100 in 
unambiguous in stating the actions 
applies--"any action commenced wit 
to which it 
hin due time." 
Because an action is "commenced" pursuant to § 2003 by 
filing a petition in the trial cou 
be obtained in an original action 
party of the savings provision of 
The Oklahoma court concluded: 
We recognize that the purpose of a 
rt, service need no 
in order to avail a 
§ 100. 
statute of 
limitations is to ensure that a party has notice of a 
claim against him/her within a sta tutory period of 
time and an adequate opportunity to prepare his/her 
case. However, § 100 was enacted 
results flowing from the general r 
-3-
fco avoid the harsh 
ule that where an 
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action fails and the statute of limitations has 
expired during the interim, any subsequent action is 
untimely. 
62 Okla. B.J. 2429-2430. 
The same analysis is applicable in this action. The 
Utah savings statute allows no room for ambiguity, it provides 
that its protections are afforded to "any action" which falls 
within its parameters. The Jesuitical lengths to which 
Appellants have gone to prove their case demonstrates the 
poverty of their argument. 
The Appellants argue further that they were injured by 
Standard Federal's lack of diligence in reinstating its 
action. There is no requirement within Section 78-12-40, the 
Utah savings statute, that an action be filed at any given 
point within the one-year period provided. Kirkbride and Soule 
apparently have not minded remaining in a "state of financial 
uncertainty" during the pendency of this litigation. The 
Appellants' argument in this regard lacks any analysis as to 
precisely what constitutes a "reasonable period" within which 
an action should be filed under the savings statute. 
B. The Utah Savings Statute Applies 
To Deficiency Actions 
The Court correctly observed that there is a paucity 
of case law regarding the application of a savings statute to a 
statute establishing a right to a deficiency action. Further, 
there is no legislative history appended to either statute 
which could be used to guide the Court. In the absence 
-4-
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of these lodestars, the Court's reasoning peaches a fair and 
just result. 
Kirkbride and Soule repeat two arguments in support of 
their position. First, they threaten that,| if the Court's 
decision is not reversed, the Court will unwittingly adopt a 
'minority view". In support of this conten 
an American Jurisprudence paragraph and supporting citations. 
upport Appellant's 
ving a trust deed 
There are, however, no modern cases which s 
position, and no citation to any case involj 
deficiency statute. 
The primary argument relied upon bly Kirkbride and 
Soule is that the Utah savings statute appl 
causes of action identified in Section 78-1 
Relying upon the same American Jurisprudenc 
tion, they cite to 
ies only to those 
2-1, e_t seq. 
le paragraph, 
Appellants assert that the deficiency statu| 
of action not found at common law, and thus 
the general application of the savings stat 
correctly rejected this artificial standard 
The Court's decision to examine th 
application of the savings statute to a def 
sound jurisprudence. As the Court stated, 
statute does not, by its terms, contain a 1 
te creates a right 
is not subject to 
hte. The Court 
e practical 
iciency period is 
:^he deficiency 
imitation upon 
rights conferred by the statute. Instead, the commencement 
requirement is a procedural hurdle to the s 
absolute bar. 
ait rather than an 
-5-
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Further, Kirkbride and Soule's attempted distinction 
between "statutory" and common law actions lacks clarity and is 
unfounded. According to their construction, the limitation 
periods set forth in Title 78 of the Utah Code Ann, are 
independent of all other statutes. Thus, tolling periods for 
infancy or other disability (Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-36), for 
absence from the state (Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-38), or for 
death (Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-37), would have no applicability 
to any cause of action codified outside Title 78. 
This has not been the finding of this Court. In 
Szarak v. Sandoval, 636 P.2d 1082, (1981), the court determined 
that infancy tolled the limitations period contained in the 
Utah Uniform Act on Paternity, Utah Code Ann. § 78-45a-l, et 
seg. Similarly, infancy tolls the statutory period identified 
in Utah's Wrongful Death statute, Utah Code Ann. § 78-11-7. 
Switzer v. Reynolds, 606 P.2d 244, 245 (1980). Utah is firmly 
in the camp of states which recognize that, unless otherwise 
clearly stated within the statute, periods of limitation affect 
the remedy and not the right of action. Kirkbride, 161 Utah 
Adv. Rep. at p. 27. 
Finally, Kirkbride and Soule can articulate no 
rational basis for the distinction they urge the court to 
adopt. In one sense, a deficiency action is merely a 
codification of the right to collect a debt, one of the writs 
recognized from the dawn of common law. The legislature has 
-6-
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undertaken to circumscribe that ability to (collect a debt, but, 
as the Court recognizes, has not legislated the right out of 
existence. 
C. The Court's Decision is Consistent 
With Its Prior Rulings 
The Appellants seek to identify th 
departure from prior Utah jurisprudence. They suggest that the 
is case as a radical 
r, inexplicably, 
is inaccurate. 
theory or case law 
their Petition for 
s presented in their 
Court was unaware of many of these cases, o 
ignored them in making its decision. This 
Kirkbride and Soule present no newj 
which supports their contention. Instead, 
Rehearing repeats the same argument that wa 
initial Brief. The Court has considered it^ prior decisions 
and its present ruling is consistent with tpose rulings. 
For example, Kirkbride and Soule atgue that the 
Court's decision in AAA Fencing Co. v. Rain|:ree Development and 
i 
Energy Co., 714 P.2d 289 (1986) is an example of where the 
Court has recognized the Utah Mechanics' Lien Statute to be 
contain a limitation upon a right, rather than a limitation of 
a remedy. The conclusion to be drawn from this, is that the 
deficiency statute is to be similarly construed. Appellants 
ignore the fundamental distinguishing featute of AAA, however; 
that being that no action was commenced und^r the statute at 
issue in AAA. Had an action been commenced|under the Utah 
Mechanic's Lien Statute, the Court could ha^e then addressed 
that particular issue. In this case, as distinguished from 
-7-
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AAA, there is no question that an action was commenced in a 
timely fashion pursuant to the requirements of Utah Code Ann. 
§ 57-1-32. 
Similarly, Kirkbride and Soule cite Projects 
Unlimited, Inc. v. Copper State Thrift & Loan Co., 798 P.2d 738 
(Utah 1990) as authority for their contention that the 
commencement restriction in that statute is exempt from the 
tolling and renewal statutes. In that case, however, the Court 
recognized that other provisions of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, including the relation back of amendments, do apply 
to the mechanic's lien laws. The court gave special 
consideration to the fact that an action had been commenced 
under the mechanic's lien statute, noting "[c]commencing the 
action preserves the lien." As in the instant case, the 
primary requirement of the statute is that an action be 
commenced, a restriction satisfied in this action. 
CONCLUSION 
Appellants' Petition for Rehearing fails to enunciate 
any reason for the Court to revisit its decision in this 
action. The Petition merely restates already-argued points of 
law and case law, and fails to forward any legal theory which 
would justify reversal. The Petition for Rehearing should be 
denied. 
-8-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
^ 
DATED this ) day of January, 1992. 
PRINCE, YEATES & GELDZAHLER 
By 
Thomas \M. Melton 
Attorneys for Appellees! 
DELIVERY CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that, on the 3rd day d 
caused to be hand-delivered, one (1) origin 
and correct copies of the foregoing Responsj 
Rehearing to: 
Utah Supreme Court 
State Capitol Building 
Salt Lake City, UT 
and four (4) copies of each to the following 
BACKMAN, CLARK & MARSH 
Ralph J. Marsh 
800 Mclntyre Building 
68 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
f January, 1992, I 
al and ten (10) true 
e to Petition for 
4529F 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
